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ABSTRACT
In this paper, we address the detection of rogue autonomous ve-
hicles using an integrated approach involving computer vision,
activity monitoring and contextual information. The proposed ap-
proach can be used to detect rogue autonomous vehicles using
sensors installed on observer vehicles that are used to monitor and
identify the behavior of other autonomous vehicles operating on
the road. The safe braking distance and the safe following time are
computed to identify if an autonomous vehicle is behaving prop-
erly. Our preliminary results show that there is a wide variation in
both the safe following time and the safe braking distance recorded
using three autonomous vehicles in a test-bed. These initial results
show significant progress for the future efforts to coordinate the
operation of autonomous, semi-autonomous and non-autonomous
vehicles.
CCS CONCEPTS
• Security and privacy→ Distributed systems security.
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1 INTRODUCTION
There has been significant progress to develop and enhance au-
tonomous vehicles, especially in control systems and computer
vision, with the ultimate goal being to enable the vehicles to self-
drive [2–5]. This progress has allowed for many autonomous and
semi-autonomous vehicles at various levels of automation to be op-
erating on the roads today. More recently, however, there has been
some work to address security of autonomous vehicles, especially
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on the computer vision aspect [1]. This includes adversarial train-
ing and including unexpected objects in plain view of the vehicle’s
camera to modify its object recognition.
Addressing the security of autonomous vehicles is critical as
they become more widespread. A rogue vehicle is one which is
not behaving correctly — this could be due to faulty or compro-
mised sensors—for example, following too closely with the vehicle
in front, whether it is autonomous or not. In densely populated
cities such as New York City, Los Angeles, Chicago, etc., we often
observe ordinary manually-operated vehicles driving erratically:
swerving in traffic, driving much faster or much slower than other
vehicles, rolling through stop signs, etc. As traffic densities continue
to rise, we can expect that unsafe driving patterns will becomemore
prevalent, threatening the safety of people in the vehicle, in other
vehicles, and pedestrians on the road. Introducing autonomous
vehicles into the traffic patterns will create more unknowns, as
human drivers must learn to interact with autonomous systems on
the same roads.
Instead of securing individual components or each communica-
tion protocol of an autonomous and semi-autonomous vehicular
system, we consider a different perspective of addressing vehicular
security. Securing each individual component is not scalable as new
components by different manufacturers get introduced. A vehi-
cle, whether autonomous, semi-autonomous, or non-autonomous,
should only exhibit certain behaviors: e.g., drive within certain
speed ranges, switch lanes when necessary, make safe turns, etc.
The holistic approach is to have every vehicle or a significant subset
of vehicles monitor other vehicles and categorize their behavior,
building on the tradition of distributed systems research by estab-
lishing consensus. By using voting mechanisms, the monitoring
vehicles can make a determination of if a vehicle is rogue and con-
duct an election to make a determination of how to respond to the
rogue vehicle. Invalid or malicious behavior can then be reported. A
detected bad behavior could be due to one hacked component (e.g.
hacked accelerometer) or one faulty component (e.g. smudge on
camera). Assuming that the majority of autonomous vehicles are
behaving correctly and correctly functioning cameras and sensors,
this approach can achieve a higher scale of security and be used to
take an appropriate action.
A major challenge in this line of work is that—fortunately for
passengers and drivers—rogue autonomous vehicles are not yet
widely prevalent on the roads. This lack of exemplar behaviormakes
the task of distinguishing rogue vehicles difficult. We do, however,
have the occasional opportunity to observe rogue behavior from
human-controlled vehicles on the road: non-autonomous vehicles
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Figure 1: Our design with the three main components along
with their requirements.
or bicycles rolling through stop signs and red lights, vehicles weav-
ing through traffic, etc. All of these examples provide a glimpse of
the possible behavior that rogue autonomous vehicles could exhibit.
The overall goals and contributions of this research are
• Introduce a new approach to secure autonomous vehicles by
detecting rogue vehicle behavioral patterns.
• Introduce a realistic threat model for autonomous vehicle
and rogue vehicles.
Figure 1 shows an overview of our design.
2 THREAT MODEL
In this work, our goal is to identify software on autonomous vehicles
that is not functioning properly, either because of (a) the software
is buggy, (b) it is intentionally compromised by a malicious agent,
or (c) the vehicle is experiencing hardware failure(s) that cause
software malfunctions. Our goal is to identify this broad class of
malfunctions in real time by observing the behavior of each vehicle
on the road. In our threat model, there are two classes of rogue
vehicles: those that are intentionally violating traffic rules and those
that are experiencing undetected malfunctions which cause them
to unintentionally violate traffic rules. In either case, we define a
rogue vehicle as one that is experiencing a malfunction that causes
it to behave in an unexpected fashion.
We confine our definition of rogue vehicles to those that are
experiencing software or hardware failures that cause malfunctions
under normal road conditions. For example, we assume that an
adversary is not attempting to compromise vehicles by defacing
or damaging environmental controls like stop signs, stop lights,
etc. We also assume that the machine learning process works as
expected and there are no adversaries or tampering during the
learning process. The machine learning algorithm is used to deter-
mine normal behavior and predict that a vehicle is rogue since it is
expecting abnormal behavior.
The rogue vehicles could have one or more faulty components,
for example, a broken LIDAR sensor or a smudge on the camera.
Alternatively, the rogue vehicles could also have been hacked. In
Minimum Distance before Collision
Route #1 Route #2 Route #3
AV2 -> AV1 0.3048m 0.254m 0.127m
AV3 -> AV1 0.1905m 0.1778m 0.2159m
Exposure Time during Travel
Route #1 Route #2 Route #3
AV2 -> AV1 2.13 seconds 3.33 seconds 2.4 seconds
AV3 -> AV1 2.66 seconds 2.40 seconds 2.25 seconds
Table 1: Measurements of Braking Distance Scenarios.
our threat model, we are not considering how they are hacked or
faulty, but consider alterations from the general behavior of the
vehicle.
All vehicles on the road, whether autonomous or manually-
operated, can act as rogue vehicle detectors. Our assumption is
that the majority of autonomous vehicles would behave correctly,
which could be determined by establishing consensus. We also
assume that vehicles have the necessary hardware to sense their
environment and that they have reasonable wireless communica-
tions capabilities (a reasonable assumption in urban areas with 5G,
where autonomous vehicles are likely to be deployed).
3 EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS
Weperformed an experiment involving three prototype autonomous
vehicles. One autonomous vehicle was following another autonomous
vehicle. The first autonomous vehicle braked to a complete stop,
during which time the safe braking distance for the autonomous
vehicle that was following it was recorded. We repeated this experi-
ment three times with two different following autonomous vehicles.
Table 1 shows the distance needed for the following autonomous
vehicle to brake to a complete stop without colliding with the car
in front of it. The time needed to brake that minimum distance
is also recorded. The table shows that there is a variation in both
the minimum distance before collision and the time to brake. This
implies that any rogue vehicle detection needs to take into account
these deviations and possible errors during monitoring.
Our experimental results show that detecting rogue vehicles is
a non-trivial problem. The sensors in the three types of vehicles
have different ranges of accuracy and sensitivity. The fact that
such differences require coordination among autonomous, semi-
autonomous and non-autonomous vehicles presents a significant
distributed data-management challenge.
4 DISCUSSION AND FUTUREWORK
We have laid out our vision for the future of secure operation of
autonomous vehicles with a focus on detecting rogue vehicles in
operation. This is a low-cost solution, leveraging the information
from nearby autonomous vehicles. To achieve this fully, a more
realistic test-bed needs to be created with autonomous vehicles
equipped with cameras, sensors, and short-range communications
capabilities.
Each of our components – computer vision, activity monitor-
ing, and contextual information – would then need to be slowly
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incorporated and tested for efficiency and effectiveness in the test-
bed. Autonomous vehicles exhibiting one or more–and possibly
different–rogue behaviors will need to be identified. False-positive
errors are inherent in any kind of detection scheme and will need
to be taken into account in the larger test-bed. We also plan to
utilize machine learning so appropriate training data will need to
be collected. Training data itself presents a non-trivial challenge as
visual data in particular requires substantial storage that must be
maintained for repeated analysis as vision algorithms are improved
over time.
This work can also be extended to detect rogue objects, such as
rogue bicycles, rogue pedestrians, even rogue unmanned aerial vehi-
cles or drones. This is feasible as connected autonomous drones and
autonomous delivery robots are being deployed. Moreover, pedes-
trians and bicyclists could have an always-on Internet connection.
Therefore, smartphones could be used to capture data to detect
rogue pedestrians and bicycles. While these always-oh Internet
connections are mostly delivered today via smartphones, with one
connected mobile device per human, there is every reason to expect
that more and more always-on wireless devices will be connected
using 4G/5G connections, which would allow rogue pedestrians
and bicycles to participate using whatever device (and on board)
happens to be available.
The accelerometer and the GPS units in the smart phone could
be used to verify the secure operation of the autonomous vehicle.
This could be done by comparing the accelerometer and the GPS
readings on the mobile phone with those readings recorded by sen-
sors in the autonomous vehicle. This could give an additional way
of checking if the vehicle’s sensors are functioning properly and if
they are sending accurate signals or if they have been compromised
due to a faulty component or operation. Accordingly, the security
verification system will not have to rely entirely on expensive sen-
sor equipment attached to the vehicle that may not be detached.
Instead, a low-cost method of using the built-in sensors of smart
phones could provide a reliable alternative solution to the security
problem of addressing rogue autonomous vehicles.
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